

SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS

'Mere Bellies?': A New Look at *Theogony* 26–8*

One of the most famous scenes in classical literature is the *Dichterweihe* at the beginning of the *Theogony* (22–35): when Hesiod was tending his sheep below Mount Helicon, the Muses approached him, provided him with a staff and a divine voice, and told him to sing of the blessed, everlasting gods. Before the initiation proper, they gave, in two notorious hexameters, a brief account of their own powers:

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι
(27–8).

We know to tell many lies similar to true things;
we also know to speak the truth, if we want to.

This riddling statement about the twofold ability of the Muses has long fascinated readers of Hesiod, and the last century or so has seen a large number of differing scholarly interpretations. Controversy rages not just over what exactly the goddesses meant to say, but also over the implications their words have for our understanding of Hesiod's self-awareness as a poet, Archaic Greek views of poetry, the role of fiction in literature, and various other issues. In order to position our own interpretation in the debate, it will be useful briefly to survey the scholarly literature. Without even attempting a comprehensive *historia quaestionis*, we may discern two main approaches to the problem.¹

The first view, which is probably still the *communis opinio*, holds that the Muses distinguish between two kinds of poetry, one consisting of lies similar to true things (27), the other characterized by the truth (28). The second kind is preferable to the first (truth is superior to lies), and Hesiod implies that what the Muses give to him is the poetry of truth. In support of this reading, scholars point to v. 32, where Hesiod is inspired to sing τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, a phrase which is taken to be equivalent to 'the truth' and which is a shortened version of the formula τὰ τ' ἐόντα τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, used of the Muses' own song (38), as well as of the seer Calchas in the *Iliad* (1.70).²

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¹ For earlier views, see the discussion and literature cited in Stroh (1976); since then, note esp. Svenbro (1976) 46–73, Pucci (1977) 8–44 (a reworking of an earlier paper), Kannicht (1980) 13–21, Neitzel (1980), Rösler (1980) 295–7, Arthur (1983), Thalmann (1984) 143–9, Ferrari (1988), Puelma (1989) 74–9, Nagy (1990b) 43–7 (building on earlier work) and Pratt (1993) 106–13.

² The contention of Stroh (1976) 88–9 (with reference to B. van Groningen) that 'what was and will be' does not refer to the truth, but rather means 'all and sundry', is unlikely in view of the Homeric parallel, apart from the fact that the proposed meaning would add a somewhat banal touch to the gift of the Muses. The opinion of Neitzel (1980) 397–8 that the phrase is

While all critics who adhere to what might be called the 'dualist' interpretation of *Th.* 27–8 concur that the 'good' poetry of v. 28 is that of Hesiod himself, there is considerably less agreement as to who is the target of v. 27. While some hold that Hesiod did not intend to polemicize against any particular kind or genre of poetry, but wished only to stress the truth inherent in his own work,³ many have felt that 'lies similar to true things' is intended as a jab at Homeric epic, from which Hesiod wanted to dissociate himself;⁴ still others have suggested that the criticism is aimed at local genealogies or theogonies.⁵

In contrast to the majority of scholars, who favour one or another version of the approach just described, a few dissenters have put forth interpretations that one might label 'monist'. These critics hold that the two verses form a unity and refer to *all* poetry, including Hesiod's own. All poetry is a mixture of lies and truth, an acknowledgment on the part of Hesiod that some regard as an expression of the poet's positive attitude toward fiction⁶ and others see as implying the (Derridean) recognition that language always signifies

a circumlocution of 'das ewige Göttliche' (398) is likewise open to a number of objections, including that vv. 32–4 would then be awkwardly pleonastic. Critics have wondered why Hesiod is not granted the ability to sing of the present (τὰ τ' ἐόντα) as well; none of the suggested answers is altogether convincing (and, of course, pedantic readers such as Lycinus in Lucian's *Conversation with Hesiod* 1 can also point to the fact that, despite the Muses' inspiration, Hesiod never really treats the future either).

³ See, e.g., Rösler (1980) 296–7 with n.34, Stein (1990) 11 and Rudhart (1996) 30.

⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche brings this view to the point with the pithy formulation, 'Lügensang ist homerisch, Wahrsang hesiodeisch' (Nietzsche (1995) 54, from a lecture of 1874/5 on the history of Greek literature); see also, e.g., Luther (1935) 125, Latte (1946) 159–63, Verdenius (1972) 234–5, Murray (1981) 91, Puelma (1989) 75, Arrighetti (1992), Finkelberg (1998) 157–60 and Pöhlmann (1998) 247–51. Somewhat differently, Kambylis (1965) 62–3 and Kannicht (1980) 15–21 contend that v. 27 is not a polemic against Homeric epic, but simply a fair description of the genre (compare also Lanata (1963) 24–5). As Stroh (1976) 110–12 has demonstrated, the view that Hesiod is specifically attacking Homer usually goes hand in hand with the assumption that the Boeotian poet 'founded' a new genre, one dedicated to the 'truth', namely didactic poetry. As Stroh shows, however, it is anachronistic to regard Hesiod's works as didactic; the *Theogony*, at least, certainly qualifies as traditional epic (compare Ford (1997) 406–8).

⁵ Local genealogies: Svenbro (1976) 65–7; local theogonies: Nagy (1990b) 45–7. The interpretations of Svenbro and Nagy are discussed in greater detail below.

⁶ This view was vigorously put forward by Stroh (1976) and subsequently heavily criticized, e.g., by Kannicht (1980), Neitzel (1980) and Rösler (1980). Pratt (1993) 106–13 proposes a similar reading, and Thalmann (1984) 146–9 and Heath (1985) 258–9 lean in the same direction but are more tentative; see also the literature cited in Neitzel (1980) 388 n.3. Neitzel suggests a quite different 'monist' interpretation: according to him, both verses refer solely to *non-Hesiodic* poetry, which Hesiod realized was characterized by some truth (28) and many lies (27) — whereupon he decided to compose different, 'truthful', poetry himself.

with a 'difference' and that the truth is therefore irrecoverable.⁷

As will become clear in the course of this paper, our own understanding of the enigmatic distich places us among the dualists: we do think that the lines describe two distinct capacities of the Muses and that v. 32 implies that Hesiod is inspired specifically with the truth. However, we also believe that there is more to be said and that the statement about poetry must be viewed in context. For what nearly all readings of the passage have in common, dualist and monist alike, is that they pay little attention to the fact that the Muses' speech does not consist of vv. 27–8 alone. Before telling Hesiod about lies and truth, the goddesses—somewhat less famously, but no less cryptically—address the shepherd as follows:

ποιμένες ἄργραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα,
γαστέρες οἶον (26).

Shepherds who dwell in the fields, worthy of reproach, mere bellies.⁸

The logical connection of this line to what follows is not obvious, and according to the scholia, already Apollonius of Rhodes found v. 26 problematic: Ἀπολλώνιος μὲν ὁ Ῥόδιος λείπειν τὸν πρῶτον στίχον φησὶν (Σ *ad* 26). It is not entirely clear what this is supposed to mean—West (1966) 162 translates, 'Apollonius says that the sense of the first line (sc. 26) is incomplete'⁹—but it does at any rate indicate a certain puzzlement over the verse, a puzzlement that at least some modern commentators have admitted to sharing: 'Scilicet offendit Apollonium oratio Musarum elliptica' (van Lennep (1843) 146).¹⁰

If they discuss v. 26 at all, scholars typically point out that abuse is a traditional feature of stories of initiation and inspiration.¹¹ Still, to quote William G. Thalmann, even if the line represents the 'divine abuse of mortals typical in scenes of epiphany', this 'does not

explain the *content* of this reproach' (Thalmann (1984) 143). When one tries to understand why the Muses address Hesiod with these particular words, it is the third part of the tricolon that poses the most problems: after all, ποιμένες ἄργραυλοι is a fair description of the shepherds' style of life (the phrase is found also in *Il.* 18.162, where it is likewise verse-initial) and κάκ' ἐλέγχεα is a 'standard epic term of abuse' (West (1966) *ad loc.*), which also appears in *Il.* 2.235, 5.787 and 8.228. What, however, is the force of γαστέρες οἶον? The scholia gloss the two words with περὶ τὴν γαστέρα μόνην ἀσχολούμενοι καὶ μόνα τὰ τῆς γαστρὸς φρονούντες, and Hesychius paraphrases them as τροφῆς μόνης ἐπιμελούμενοι. In other words, the shepherds are personified as 'mere bellies' because they live only to fill their stomachs, uninterested in anything but food. Everyone who has commented on the line shares this basic reading, which connects the 'bellies' with the notion of eating. Taking the phrase as referring to gluttony does not, however, explain why the Muses would choose to attack the shepherds in this way or what the connection is between v. 26 and the following statement about the truth and lies of poetry.

The *communis opinio* on this question holds that the Muses are creating a contrast between the shepherds and themselves: while Hesiod and his ilk live a semi-bestial life given to base sensuality, the goddesses stand for a 'higher' form of existence dedicated to art and intellectual achievement. With their words they rouse Hesiod to abandon his previous life as a 'mere belly' and to become a poet instead.¹²

This view has been vehemently attacked by Jesper Svenbro, whose 1976 book *La parole et le marbre* contains an extensive and very influential discussion of the use of γαστήρ in Archaic Greek epic. Building on a detailed analysis of numerous passages in the *Odyssey* in which Odysseus, notably in his disguise as a beggar, is represented as dominated by the demands of his belly (see *Od.* 6.133–6; 7.215–21; 15.344–5; 17.226–8, 286–9, 473–4 and 558–9; and 18.53–4, 362–4 and 380), Svenbro concludes that the γαστήρ stands not for the 'material' as opposed to the 'intellectual', but rather for life outside society, dependence on others and laziness.¹³ While his discussion of the semantics of the belly is enlightening, Svenbro completes his interpretation of *Th.* 26–8 with the unwarranted claim that the 'shepherds' of v. 26 are poets who produce the kind

⁷ See Pucci (1977) 8–44 and Arthur (1983). According to Pucci, Hesiod's claim that his own poetry is characterized by truth is nothing but wishful thinking since '[t]he "original" signified is always absent' (13) and the poet therefore 'cannot control the difference that marks his as any other discourse' (27). For an extensive critique of Pucci's and Arthur's Derridean interpretations, see Ferrari (1988).

⁸ For the use of the plural instead of the singular, see West (1966) 160. There is no need to assume that the Muses are speaking to a group of shepherds.

⁹ Schoemann (1868) 302–3 suggests that τινὰ μετὰ has been lost after λείπειν, i.e., Apollonius believed that a verse was missing after 26; this conjecture is rejected by West (1966) 162 and Di Gregorio (1975) 7. The scholiast who, after quoting Apollonius, added οὐ λείπει δέ, ἀλλ' ἔστι and proceeded to cite v. 26 as we have it must have understood that Apollonius' complaint was that his text did not contain the line itself — which would seem a rather silly interpretation. Andrew Ford has mentioned to us the possibility that Apollonius read γαστέρες οἶον (with *spiritus asper*) and thus expected a comparison or explanation to follow.

¹⁰ See also the comments of Schoemann (1868) 303, Thalmann (1984) 143–4 and Pratt (1993) 107–8.

¹¹ See esp. West (1966) 160, with parallels, as well as Tucker (1987).

¹² See, e.g., van Lennep (1843) 145, Luther (1935) 124–5, Latte (1946) 158, Otto (1955) 32, Fränkel (1962) 105–6, Kambylis (1965) 62–3, Stroh (1976) 88 with n.12 (with further references), Kannicht (1980) 14, Neitzel (1980) 387, Arthur (1983) 100–4, Thalmann (1984) 144–6 and Pratt (1993) 108 (the last two authors are more tentative).

¹³ See Svenbro (1976) 50–9. Svenbro's analysis is accepted by Arthur (1983) and Thalmann (1984), who, however, draw different conclusions from it, and, most important, by Nagy (1990b; see already Nagy (1979) 261 n.4), on whose interpretation see n.16. Somewhat similar to Svenbro is Jean-Pierre Vernant in Detienne and Vernant (1979) 92–8, according to whom the γαστήρ symbolizes 'la condition humaine' in general (95); on the role of the belly in the *Odyssey*, see also Rose (1975) 141–5 and Pucci (1987) 157–208 (with remarks on *Th.* 26–8 on pp. 192–3).

of poetry described in v. 27:¹⁴ their designation as 'bellies' shows that they are singers who, in order to make a living, must depend on the local aristocracy, which is why they produce heroic genealogies characterized by lies.¹⁵ By contrast, Hesiod, who is economically independent, can afford to compose poetry that contains nothing but the truth.¹⁶

The theory of Svenbro and his followers that the 'bellies' of v. 26 are 'poets motivated by their belly' fails to convince, among other reasons because it is, after all, Hesiod himself who is addressed in the line, not a group distinct from him (see n.8). Their reading would entail that Hesiod was already a poet even before encountering the Muses and that the *Dichterweihe* merely transformed him from a poet of lies into a poet of truth—an inherently unlikely interpretation (contrast esp. vv. 22 and 31–2, where the Muses teach him 'beautiful song' and inspire him with 'divine voice'). However, we do agree with Svenbro that it would be desirable if v. 26, instead of simply being a string of (ritual) insults, could be shown to have something to do with poetry and thus be more intimately connected with the two lines that follow.¹⁷ In the remainder of the paper, we suggest such a connection and propose a new reading of γαστέρες οἶον.

As critics routinely point out, the passage *Th.* 22–35 describes poetry in terms reminiscent of prophecy. We have already mentioned that the Muses inspire Hesiod to sing τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα (32; see the discussion of West (1966) *ad loc.*), an ability that links him with the seer Calchas; it is also noteworthy that the voice he is given is 'divine' (αὐδῆν / θέσπιν, 31–2). Furthermore, scholars have shown that Hesiod's encounter with the Muses contains many traditional elements found cross-

¹⁴ Surprisingly, a number of scholars hold that v. 26 is directed at the 'bad' poets or at those who rejoice in 'lies similar to true things': see, e.g., Mazon (1928) 6, Pucci (1977) 10–12 and (1987) 192, Tucker (1987) 42 and *passim*, Nagy (1990b) 45–6, Grottanelli (1992) 240 and Rudhart (1996) 30–1. West (1966) 162, too, believes that the Muses mean to tell Hesiod, 'You have lived your life in ignorance of the truth.' However, there is no indication that v. 26 is aimed at the shepherds' putative bad poetics or love of lies. Just because both v. 26 and v. 27 appear to have negative connotations, it does not follow that the negative value of both lines is the same. The faulty logic of this kind of reading is rightly attacked by Verdenius (1972) 234 and esp. Judet de La Combe (1993) 26–30.

¹⁵ To bolster his argument, Svenbro (1976) 59 points to the supposed parallel of *Od.* 14.124–5: vagabonds in need of food tell stories that are false but pleasing to potential benefactors (see also Nagy (1990b) 44).

¹⁶ Gregory Nagy has adopted Svenbro's reading, developing it further in accordance with his own theories. For Nagy (1990b) 45–7, the 'bellies' of v. 26 are local poets, dependent on local sponsorship, whose poetry consists of local, untrue, versions; Hesiod, on the other hand, is a pan-Hellenic poet whose work is independent and characterized by the truth.

¹⁷ The hypothesis of Tucker (1987) that the designation 'mere bellies' is linked to the dietary restrictions of mystery religion and points to a connection between food and poetry found elsewhere in Greek literature (notably in the Callimachean ideal of the 'slender Muse') is, in our opinion, unconvincing.

culturally in stories of men's initiation or inspiration by a divinity¹⁸ and is especially rich in parallels to those scenes in the Old Testament where prophets receive their call from God.¹⁹ This last fact attests to the well-known link between the Hesiodic poems and Near Eastern thought and has also been regarded as one piece of evidence in a larger argument about the nexus of poetry and prophecy. As anthropological research has shown, the role of the poet and that of the prophet are intimately connected in many cultures, and it has been claimed that in Greece, too, poetry and prophecy originally formed a unity.²⁰

Given this affinity of the mantic and the poetic, it is interesting to discover that the ancient world knew a form of prophecy that specifically employed the belly, γαστήρ. Its practitioners were known mostly as ἐγγαστρίμυθοι (other names are ἐγγαστριμάντις, στερνομάντις, ἐντερομάντις, Εὐρυκλείς and Πύθωνες) and, to judge from our sources, they prophesied by means of a voice that came from their belly.²¹ While ἐγγαστρίμυθος is typically glossed as *ventriloquus* in (post-Classical) Latin, it is clear that these people were not ventriloquists in the modern sense, but rather mediums whose stomachs had been taken over by demons.²² In fact, although the term ἐγγαστρίμυθος could be used of the possessed person, it appears to denote even more often the spirit believed to reside in, and speak from, that person's belly.²³

¹⁸ Compare the list in West (1966) 159–60; see also Ritoók (1970) and Slings (1989) on accounts of *Dichterweihen* in various cultures.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Trencsényi-Waldapfel (1955) 47–57 and Dornseiff (1959) 38 and 76, as well as the discussion below in the text.

²⁰ See the classic account of Chadwick (1942) and now the papers in Kugel (ed.) (1990) and Leavitt (ed.) (1997), esp. Leavitt (1997). For Greece, see, e.g., Dodds (1951) 64–101 and Nagy (1990a).

²¹ Some of the evidence is collected in Wikenhauser (1921) 401–7, *FrGH ad* 328 F78 and *TrGF 4 ad Soph. fr.* 59 (Sophocles is said to have coined the name στερνόμαντις). For the practice, see, e.g., Tambornino (1909) 59–60, Weinreich (1910), Halliday (1913) 244–5, Amandry (1950) 64–5, Dodds (1951) 71–2, Onians (1954) 489–90 n.1, and Rouillard and Tropper (1987) 242–4. The most extensive 'modern' discussion, with a wealth of sources, is *De engastrimytho syntagma* of Leo Allatius (Leone Allacci), published in Paris in 1629 as part of a larger work (*S. P. N. Eustathii archiepiscopi Antiocheni, et martyris, in Hexahemeron commentarius* [...]).

²² Compare Dodds (1951) 71–2, who draws attention to *Hp. Epid.* 5.63 (~7.28), which mentions the heavy breathing of the ἐγγαστρίμυθοι. As Dodds writes, 'Ventriloquists do not breathe stertorously; modern "trance mediums" often do' (72). It is possible, of course, that actual ventriloquists may on occasion have fraudulently posed as possessed ἐγγαστρίμυθοι. This may even be the reason why we speak of 'ventriloquism' in the first place, despite the fact that this technique does not involve the belly. Compare Galen, the only ancient writer who (quite unlike Hippocrates, whom he is glossing) unequivocally takes the ἐγγαστρίμυθοι to be real ventriloquists: ἐγγαστρίμυθοι οἱ κεκλεισμένου τοῦ στόματος φθεγγόμενοι, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς φθέγγεσθαι (19.94 Kühn).

²³ The first sense is clearest in a scholion to *Pl. SpH.* 252c (a passage that mentions the ἐγγαστρίμυθος Eurycles, on

Our first clear reference to this curious form of prophecy comes from the parabasis of Aristophanes' *Wasps*, where the playwright asserts that early in his career, he provided other poets with words, 'entering other stomachs in imitation of the prophecy and method of Eurycles' (μιμησάμενος τῆν Εὐρυκλέους μαντείαν καὶ διάνοιαν, | εἰς ἄλλοτρίας γαστέρας ἐνδύς, 1019–20).²⁴ As the scholia and other sources tell us, Eurycles was a 'belly-prophet' who was so well known that his name subsequently became a synonym for ἐγγαστρίμυθος itself. While it is unclear whether Eurycles was actually active at the time of Aristophanes, it is interesting that he is mentioned also by Plato, who in *Sph.* 252c 2–9 says of people who contradict themselves that they carry around, presumably in their stomach, τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα, who continuously argues against them (note that here, as in Aristophanes, Eurycles is clearly the name of the demon inside the belly).

We find references to ἐγγαστρίμυθοι throughout antiquity,²⁵ and the basic knowledge about this kind of prophecy is collected in the scholiastic and encyclopedic traditions (see the scholia to the Aristophanes and Plato passages discussed in the previous paragraph and the entries s.v. ἐγγαστρίμυθος in Hesychius and the Suda). As late as the ninth century, Photius dedicates a learned letter (*epist.* 151) to the question, Τί ἐστι πνεῦμα Πύθωνος, ὃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐγγαστρίμυθον ὀνομάζουσι; (*Amphilochia* 83). As a matter of fact, there is evidence that the practice of belly-prophecy continued at least up to the Renaissance.²⁶

whom see the next paragraph in the text): Εὐρυκλῆς γὰρ ἐδόκει δαίμονά τινα ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ ἔχειν. The second meaning is implied in, among many other sources, Lucian's dialogue *Lexiphanes*, where the eponymous character, after swallowing an emetic, perceives a mighty rumbling in his stomach and exclaims, 'I seem to have drunk an ἐγγαστρίμυθος' (20). The term ἐγγαστρίμυθος is thus ambivalent, but it is unlikely that there ever were human prophets who spoke in their own voice through other people's stomachs—a practice that Rutherford (1896) 422 and MacDowell (1971) 264 attribute to the original Eurycles, but one that is very hard to imagine.

²⁴ It is unclear whether Aristophanes is referring to entire plays that were produced for him by others or to single passages that he composed for other poets; see the discussion in Sommerstein (1983) *ad* 1018–29.

²⁵ Apart from the passages already mentioned, see esp. Philoch. *FrGH* 328 F78, Ph. *De somniis* 1.220, Plu. *Moralia* 2.414e, Erot. *fr.* 21, Poll. *Onomasticon* 2.162 and 168, Clem. Al. *Protr.* 2.11.2 and Alciaphr. 4.19.15. There is almost certainly a parodic allusion to the practice in Call. *Ap.* 189, where Apollo, yet unborn, prophesies from the womb of his mother Leto and calls himself τὸν εἰσέτι γαστέρι μάντιν (see McKay (1962) 156–8, Mineur (1984) *ad loc.* and Pelliccia (1995) 72–3); *h. Merc.* 296, where a prophetic fart of the infant Hermes is described as τλήμονα γαστρὸς ἔριθον ἀτάσθαλον ἀγγελιώτην, may also be playing with the notion of abdominal prophecy (see Pelliccia (1995) 73–4 and Katz (1999)).

²⁶ See the stories about female *uentriloquae* quoted by Allatius (see n.21) on 428–9, including one (related by Augustinus Eugubinus) about a woman who had a voice come out of her genitals and another (from Caelius Rhodiginus) concerning the Italian Iacoba, who prophesied through a demon by the name of Cincinnatulus (for the latter account,

The ἐγγαστρίμυθοι also appear in the Bible. The word occurs fifteen times in the Septuagint, where it usually translates Hebrew *'ôḥ* and compounds thereof (see Hatch and Redpath (1897) s.v.). Unfortunately, the context of most of the quotations—usually mere lists of false prophets and sorcerers to be avoided—makes it impossible to say anything about the mantic practice of these Near Eastern colleagues of Eurycles. The most prominent Biblical ἐγγαστρίμυθος, the so-called Witch of Endor, who in 1 Sam. 28 conjures up the ghost of Samuel at the behest of Saul, would, at any rate, appear to be a necromancer rather than a medium.²⁷ Turning to the Hebrew does not solve the problem since the etymology of *'ôḥ* is controversial.²⁸ Its original meaning is now often taken to be 'sacrificial pit' (with subsequent extension of reference to include 'person who uses a sacrificial pit' and 'spirit evoked by means of a sacrificial pit'), a view that linguistic and cultural parallels in a number of ancient civilizations make attractive.²⁹ However, this interpretation cannot explain why the Septuagint, as well as Josephus (*AJ* 6.14.2–4), would have chosen the translation ἐγγαστρίμυθος³⁰ or why *'ôḥ* appears to mean something like 'skin-bottle' or 'wineskin' in Job 32.19.³¹ It is thus tempting to follow Onians (1954) 488–90 and wonder whether the original sense of *'ôḥ* could not in fact be something like 'bag' or 'belly',³² which might then imply that at

see also Weinreich (1910), who discusses its influence on Rabelais, *Pantagruel* 4.58). The idea of the possessing demon who inhabits specifically the belly of his host survives into modern times (compare the proverbial expression from the German Rhineland quoted by Bargheer (1931) 102) and even contemporary popular culture: in a Pogo cartoon (Walt Kelly, 11 April 1973, reproduced in Bourguignon (1976) 2), Albert the Alligator complains that 'some fiend' has taken over his stomach; however, this particular demon does not seem to speak.

²⁷ The story of the Witch of Endor caused a great controversy among Jewish and Christian writers, who were divided as to whether the woman really was able to bring back the actual ghost of Samuel; see, e.g., Wikenhauser (1921) 406 and Schmidt (1994) 201. Allatius in his *De engastrimytho syntagma* (see n.21 and 26) sums up the debate and adds a lengthy discussion of his own; he also provides translations (into Latin) of the relevant treatises of Origen and Eustathius.

²⁸ See esp. Hoffner (1973) 141–2 and Schmidt (1994) 150–4, with rich bibliography at 150–1 n.78.

²⁹ See, e.g., Vieyra (1961), Rabin (1963) 115–16, Hoffner (1967), and Ebach and Rütterswörden (1977, 1980), all with copious references; see also W. Gesenius, *Hebräisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*, ed. by R. Meyer and H. Donner (18th ed., Berlin 1987–) s.v. *'ôḥ*. The most recent opponent of this etymology is Schmidt (1994) 151–2, who favours the view that the word means 'revenant'.

³⁰ Note also that in Is. 8.19, the Septuagint says of the ἐγγαστρίμυθοι that they speak ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας, a phrase that does not have an obvious correspondent in the Hebrew.

³¹ For an interesting (if not necessarily convincing) attempt to explain the would-be semantic change, see Spronk (1986) 252. It is, of course, possible that *'ôḥ* in Job is a different, homophonous, word; compare, e.g., *The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew*, ed. by D.J.A. Clines (Sheffield 1993–) s.v. We are not persuaded by the argument of Ebach and Rütterswörden (1977) 67–8, who claim that in Job, too—as, in their opinion, in all occurrences of the word—the meaning is 'pit'.

³² See already Hölemann (1859) 160–3; compare Hoffner (1973) 141–2 and Lust (1974) 135 n.5.

least some people in the Ancient Near East practised the same kind of abdominal prophecy that we know from our Greek sources. The question must remain open.³³ As for the New Testament, the slave girl of Philippi, whose πνεῦμα πύθωνα (v.l. Πύθωνος) St. Paul exorcises (Acts 16.16–18), is clearly an ἐγγαστρίμυθος in the familiar Greek sense.³⁴

What does all this have to do with Hesiod? Obviously, there are no ἐγγαστρίμυθοι in the *Theogony*,³⁵ but we believe that the example of the belly-prophets is a crucial piece of evidence that the γαστήρ could be viewed as an entity capable of issuing intelligent, even inspired, speech. The idea that internal organs can 'speak' (however literally this is taken) is found elsewhere in Greek literature, notably in Homer, and while it is usually a more dignified body part, such as the θυμός, that communicates with its 'owner', a man can also receive 'commands' from his γαστήρ (see, e.g., *Od.* 7.216–21).³⁶ We have already remarked on the important role played by the belly in the *Odyssey*, a work in which, as Pucci (1987) 157–208 has argued, the lowly γαστήρ takes over the role of the lofty θυμός as a prime instigator of human action. The notion that the belly can be a repository of speech shows up also, in a humorous context, in Lucian's *Lexiphanes* (21), where the title character's unbearable Atticisms are said to hide in his stomach (μεστῆ σοι αὐτῶν ἢ γαστήρ) and lower intestines (ἐν τοῖς κάτω ἐντέροις).

³³ There are basically two possibilities. The first is that ὄχ indeed originally meant 'bag' or 'belly' and that the references in the Bible are to a kind of belly-prophecy similar to that practised by the Greeks. The Septuagint's translation of ἐγγαστρίμυθος would then be wholly appropriate. Alternatively, the original meaning of ὄχ (whether it was 'pit' or something else) had been lost by the time of the Septuagint, and the translators came up with ἐγγαστρίμυθος, either as an *interpretatio Graeca* (abdominal prophecy was a kind of mantic practice with which they themselves were familiar; compare Rouillard and Tropper (1987) on how other later commentators on and translators of the Hebrew Bible anachronistically viewed the ὄχ as though they were contemporary witches and sorcerers) or, as one of the anonymous referees has suggested to us, under the influence of the passage from Job, given that a word that means 'wineskin' can easily be understood to mean something like 'belly', too (as is the case with Greek ἀσκός; see Archil. *IEG fr.* 119, Eur. *Med.* 679, Ar. *Ach.* 1002 and Antiph. *PCG fr.* 20). Note also that in Job, the wineskins are actually used as a comparandum for the belly (the passage is quoted below in the text).

³⁴ Compare Wikenhauser (1921) 401–7. Further work on the practices of the ἐγγαστρίμυθοι (including their relationship, if any, to Near Eastern forms of prophecy and magic) is a desideratum.

³⁵ Note, though, the case of Metis, whom Zeus puts into his νηδύς (*Th.* 886–900), not only to be rid of her (and to enable the subsequent birth of Athena through his head), but also, remarkably, for the purpose, ὥς οἱ συμπράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε (900); Onians (1954) 489 n.1 compares the practice of the ἐγγαστρίμυθοι (see also West (1966) *ad* 900). Metis' twofold ability to give 'good and bad' advice is interestingly reminiscent of the Muses' power to tell lies and truth alike.

³⁶ On speaking organs in general, see now Pelliccia (1995), with 54–5 specifically on γαστήρ, as well as the classic discussion of Onians (1954) 13–89 (88–9 deals with the belly).

While consciousness and intellectual ability are cross-culturally often associated with 'upper' body parts (e.g., for the Greeks, the θυμός, φρένες, κῆρ, etc.;³⁷ in our own culture, the head and the heart³⁸), there is evidence that the belly, too, can be regarded as a seat of wisdom and knowledge.³⁹ For example, German has a (rare) colloquial expression 'einen schlauen Bauch haben' ('to have a smart belly') that means 'to be clever'; in the same language, to make a decision 'aus dem Bauch' ('from the belly') is to act according to an irrational impulse, where it is typically implied—as in the case of the similar English 'gut feeling'—that such a reaction is uncannily more appropriate than one based on intellectual deliberation.⁴⁰ For evidence further afield, we may point to the fact that, according to Frazer, the Society Islanders believe that the soul is situated in the belly or bowels (thoughts are described as 'words in the belly'); similarly, Malinowski reports that the people of the Trobriand Islands of south-east Melanesia hold that memory, 'the store of formulæ and traditions learned by heart, resides ... in the belly'.⁴¹

In the Hebrew tradition, the belly (*bet en*) also appears as the locus of inspiration (see Onians (1954) 485–7). When the prophet Ezekiel receives his calling from God—a scene (Ezek. 2.1–3.4) often compared to Hesiod's *Dichterweihe*—he is presented with a scroll that 'had writing on the front and on the back, and there were written on it words of lamentation and mourning and woe' (2.10). God then tells him to eat the scroll:

And he said to me, 'Son of man, eat this scroll that I give you and fill your stomach [*bet en*] with it.' Then I ate it; and it was in my mouth as sweet as honey. And he said to me, 'Son of man, go, get you to the house of Israel, and speak with my words to them' (3.3–4).

Eating a book is an unusually sophisticated way to receive divine wisdom (see also Rev. 10.8–10). More typically, prophets are literally 'inspired' with the spirit (*ruah*) of God, which is often said to reside in their belly. Thus, in the Book of Job, Elihu feels compelled to speak,

³⁷ See, e.g., Onians (1954) 13–89 and Padel (1992) 12–48; on the Homeric usage, see most recently Jahn (1987).

³⁸ Compare Bargheer (1931) 8–113.

³⁹ For a neurobiological view of the digestive system as 'the second brain', see Gershon (1998).

⁴⁰ Compare *Duden: Das große Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, ed. by G. Drosowski (2nd ed., Mannheim 1993–) s.v. 'Bauch'. For 'einen schlauen Bauch haben', the *Duden* considers a connection with a Yiddish verb 'bauchen' ('to be knowledgeable'); unfortunately, we have been unable otherwise to ascertain the existence of this word.

⁴¹ See Frazer (1922) 297–9 and Malinowski (1922) 408–9 (quotation from 409), both cited by Onians (1954) 14 with n.3, 68 with n.4, and 172 with n.9. Note also Theodoret, who in his commentary to Ps. 30.10 (modern counting: 31.9), ἐπαράχη ἐν θυμῶι ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς μου, ἡ ψυχὴ μου, καὶ ἡ γαστήρ μου, explains the mention of the belly as follows: *Γαστέρα δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τῶν λογισμῶν ταμιεῖον ἐκάλεσεν* (*PG* 80.1080; quoted in the *Suda* s.v. γαστήρ).

For I am full of words. The spirit [*rûah*] of my belly [*bet en*] constrains me. Behold, my belly is like wine that has no vent; like new wineskins, it is ready to burst. I must speak, that I may find relief (32.18–20).⁴²

The concept of physical 'inspiration' is, of course, familiar from Greek literature, too.⁴³ Most notably, in our *Theogony* passage, the Muses literally 'breathe' divine voice 'into' Hesiod: ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδῆν / θέσπιν (31–2).⁴⁴ That the 'song' *vel sim.* transmitted from the inspiring divinity to the inspired human being is, as it were, stowed away in a specific part of the body is likewise not unknown: witness Phemius' claim, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας / παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν (*Od.* 22.347–8), as well as the reference in *h.Ap.* 518–19 to singers οἷσί τε Μοῦσα / ἐν στήθεσιν ἔθηκε θεὰ μελίγηρυν δοιδήν.⁴⁵ Admittedly, there is no explicit mention in Greek literature of a poet inspired through his γαστήρ; we hope to have shown, however, that such a notion would not have struck Hesiod and his audience as outlandish.

To return to *Th.* 26, we suggest that when the Muses address Hesiod as a 'belly', they are referring to the role that he is about to play, his role as a recipient or, rather, a receptacle of inspiration. Men who are γαστέρες οἶον are vessels for the divine voice that the goddesses of poetry breathe into them; the force of οἶον is that human beings do not become poets through their own doing, but are mere mouthpieces of the divinity, mediums to be possessed, just like the lowlier ἐγγαστρίμυθοι. On this reading, the connection of v. 26 to vv. 27–8 becomes clear: what the Muses are stressing is the total dependence of a poet on their inspiration, as well as their complete wilfulness in granting it. Teasingly, they inform Hesiod that they can

⁴² The translation from Ezekiel is that of the Revised Standard Edition; the one from Job has been somewhat adapted. Note that 'wineskins' translates the plural of 'ὄβ' (see the discussion above, with nn.31 and 33).

⁴³ For the following discussion, it is important to keep in mind that the term 'inspiration' can be used in different ways. As Carpenter (1987) 256 writes, it 'may be defined very broadly as a spiritual influence that occurs spontaneously and renders a person capable of thinking, speaking, or acting in ways that transcend ordinary human capacities. ... Taken more narrowly, the actual term ... implies the existence of a *spiritus*, or "breath," that is breathed into the soul and enlivens it.' He goes on to state that in extreme cases, it is possible to describe inspiration in terms of possession. For Greek views of inspiration, see, e.g., Dodds (1951) 80–2, Tigerstedt (1970), Murray (1981), Verdenius (1983) 37–46 and Finkelberg (1998) 18–27 and *passim*. Note that it is controversial how exactly the Archaic Greeks conceived of the inspirational process; see below in the text.

⁴⁴ On the significance of αὐδῆ, see Ford (1992) 172–97. Note, too, that the name 'Ἡσίοδος (mentioned in *Th.* 22) may synchronically have been understood as 'he who emits the voice' (a form of ἵημι + *Fοδῆ *vel sim.*; see, e.g., Nagy (1979) 296–7), even though this is probably only a folk etymology (compare Meier-Brügger (1990), who provides an exhaustive discussion of the earlier literature and a new suggestion of his own).

⁴⁵ Padel (1992) 17 writes, 'At one level, emotion or inspiration is divinity's active interest in the entrails.'

tell many lies that are similar to true things (and thus, presumably, impossible for men to tell apart) and that they can also tell the truth—but only if they want to, εὔτ' ἐθέλωμεν (28).⁴⁶ Since poets are 'mere bellies', they are able to sing only what the Muses tell them, in Hesiod's case the (supposedly truthful, see 32) song of the blessed, ever-lasting gods (33), as well as the praises of the Muses themselves (34).⁴⁷

As M.L. West points out, one of the features that Hesiod's *Dichterweihe* shares with other traditional accounts of divine inspiration is the motif that the 'man who was previously without the gift of words is suddenly granted eloquence' (West (1966) 160). This idea is reinforced by the expression γαστέρες οἶον: Hesiod presents his own role as that of a mere instrument for the song of the goddesses, a song that he did not previously possess and that is not of his own making.⁴⁸ This same thought is expressed in the one other passage in Hesiod's work where the poet refers to his encounter with the Muses. In the discussion of seafaring in the *Works and Days*, he mentions his victory at a poetic contest in Chalcis (654–7) and his subsequent dedication of a tripod to the Muses, 'who first put me on the path of high-pitched song' (659). The trip from the mainland to Chalcis was Hesiod's only experience with ships, but he will not let this prevent him from singing about the topic of the weather at sea:

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο·
Μοῦσαι γάρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον
ῥῆμνον δαίδειν (661–2).⁴⁹

⁴⁶ As West (1966) *ad loc.* points out, the reference to a god's 'will' is a 'common qualification in telling of [his or her] powers'; the use of polar oppositions (in this case, lies vs. truth) is likewise a typical feature in the description of divine ability (compare Ferrari (1988) 71 n.2). In *Th.* 27–8, the two are combined to create the impression that, in their area of expertise, the Muses are both all-powerful (all poetic discourse consists of either lies or truth, both of which are dispensed by the Muses) and, at the same time, wholly wilful in the wielding of their powers.

⁴⁷ According to Nietzsche (1995) 54, the Muses deliberately choose a 'stupid Boeotian shepherd' to be their mouthpiece: '[E]r soll nichts als Organ sein u. deshalb um so glaubwürdiger.' Nietzsche may here be indulging in a pun ('Organ' means 'internal body part', in this case the stomach, but can also be understood as 'instrument' or 'voice') — without realizing that his words actually reflect a hidden meaning of the text itself.

⁴⁸ We may perceive a strategy of self-justification here: if Hesiod's song comes from the Muses, and from the Muses alone, he cannot be held responsible for its contents (including its truthfulness or the lack thereof). Interestingly, in Lucian's *Conversation with Hesiod* 4, the poet considers using this very argument against the criticism that he never treated the future (τά τ' ἐσόμενα, *Th.* 32; see n.2) in his works: 'Ενῆν μὲν μοι, ὦ βέλτιστε, ραϊδίαν ἀπόκρισιν ἀποκρίνεσθαί σοι περὶ πάντων, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐστὶν τῶν ἐρραψωιδημένων ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἴδιον ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν Μουσῶν, καὶ ἐχρῆν σε παρ' ἐκείνων τοὺς λογισμοὺς τῶν τε εἰρημένων καὶ τῶν παραλειμμένων ἀπαιτεῖν.

⁴⁹ As West (1978) *ad* 661 points out, the phrase Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο refers to Zeus's role as the controller of the 'seasonal cycle of wind and weather, which governs seafaring'.

But even so I shall speak the mind of aegis-bearing
Zeus,
for the Muses taught me to sing godly song.

The poet freely admits to having personally no knowledge of his topic; he is able to sing about it solely as a result of the Muses' inspiration. After all, they 'know to tell many things', lies and truth alike; he, by contrast, is a mere belly.⁵⁰

On our interpretation, γαστέρες οἶον points to a view of poetic inspiration that regards the relationship of poet and Muse as one of possessed medium and possessing divinity. The idea of poetry as a kind of ἐνθουσιασμός is found elsewhere in Greek literature and is discussed most extensively in the works of Plato. For example, in the *Ion*, Socrates tells his interlocutor that poets compose only while ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι (533e 6–7) and that they do not speak themselves, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς (534d 3–4). The poets are merely ἐρμηνηῆς (534e 4) of the gods, which is why, as Socrates contends in the *Apology*, they themselves do not know anything about what they are talking about (ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὦν λέγουσι, 22c 3; see also *Men.* 99c 11–d 5)—a claim that could easily be applied to the Hesiod who teaches seafaring in the *Works and Days*. In their inspired state, Plato holds, poets are 'mad', and their madness, μανία, links them to other possessed people, such as seers and prophets (see esp. *Phdr.* 244a 5 – 245a 8, as well as *Ap.* 22b 8 – c 2 and *Men.* 99c 11 – d 5); on one occasion, he describes the poet as 'sitting on the tripod of the Muse' (*Lg.* 719c 3–4), an allusion to the practice of the Pythia at Delphi.

While Plato's view of poetic inspiration would thus appear to aid our reading of Hesiod, we are aware that we are in danger of committing an anachronism. Many modern scholars believe that the idea of the poet's 'enthusiasm' is no older than the fifth century and due to Plato and his predecessor Democritus, who likewise held that poems came into being μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος (B18; see also B17).⁵¹ In support of this, they point especially to the evidence of Homeric epic, where the Muses, rather than possessing the poet, teach him and give him the knowledge necessary to sing his songs, and where the poet appeals to them, not for inspiration in the Platonic sense, but rather for specific pieces of information (see *Il.*

2.761–2, 11.218–20, 14.508–10 and 16.112–13).⁵² As the famous invocation before the Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2.484–93) shows, the Homeric poet is not himself wholly ignorant about his topic (despite his claim οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν, 486), but appeals to the Muses because his own information (κλέος, 486) is inferior to what they can provide. Like a good historian, he is simply looking for the best source.

These observations, though accurate, are in our opinion unable to prove that the concept of the poet as the Muses' mouthpiece was unknown in the Archaic period. It may not be conclusive that Plato calls the idea of poetic madness παλαιὸς μῦθος (*Lg.* 719c 1), but it is also not the case that a concept cannot be old just because it fails to appear in Homer. To choose an example specifically from the field of poetics, it has been shown that Homer eschews craft metaphors for poetry;⁵³ we know from cross-linguistic comparison, however, that images like the 'carpenter of words', popular with later Greek poets such as Pindar, go back to Indo-European times.⁵⁴ It is well known that Homer (by comparison with the Epic Cycle, for example) has a dislike of the supernatural and miraculous, and this may well extend to the notion of poetic possession, with its implications of irrationality. However, if we look closely at the Homeric poems, even there the idea of the poet as mouthpiece is perhaps not entirely absent. Both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* begin with an appeal to the goddess to sing herself (ἀείδε, θεά; ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα), which implies that, at some level, the song of the poet really is the song of the Muses and that he is simply acting as what Plato would have called their ἐρμηνεύς (contrast, e.g., Ἰλιον δαίδω, the beginning of the *Little Iliad*). Pointing to Phemius' famous and apparently self-contradictory statement, αὐτοῦ δίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἶμας / παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν (*Od.* 22.347–8), we may conclude that Homer is ambivalent as to whether the poet is an independent artist or a medium of the Muses—or, rather, that poetry, like so many other human activities, is subject to the so-called 'dual motivation', that is to say, is presented as caused by both humans and gods at the same time.⁵⁵

Rather than assuming that poetic inspiration in the strong sense of possession is a comparatively late concept, we regard it as more likely that from earliest times the Greeks knew both the idea of the poet as a skilled human creator and the notion that he was merely an instrument of the Muses (thus also, e.g., Fuhrmann (1992) 77); they could employ either one, depending

⁵⁰ Dornseiff (1959) 39 sums up well Hesiod's somewhat mechanical dependence on the Muses: '[D]en Rhapsodenstab braucht man nur zu bekommen, dann geht das Dichten schon. Und wenn die Muse einen lehrt, kann man auch ausführlich über ein Gebiet schreiben, von dem man nicht das Geringste versteht' (Dornseiff is one of very few readers who think that in these and other passages, Hesiod shows himself to be a master of humour: 'Hesiod liebt Scherze').

⁵¹ See, e.g., Dodds (1951) 80–2 (Dodds does not necessarily believe that Democritus and Plato 'invented' poetic frenzy, but he ventures the guess that the idea arose as a 'by-product of the Dionysiac movement', 82), Tigerstedt (1970), and Murray (1981) and (1996) 6–12. Finkelberg (1998) 19–20 downplays the difference between possession and other forms of divine inspiration, thereby in our eyes glossing over crucial distinctions.

⁵² Murray (1981) 96 sums up the relationship between the Homeric singer and his Muse as follows: it 'is an intellectual one—the Muse is asked to communicate with the bard, not to send him into a state of ecstasy'.

⁵³ See, e.g., Svenbro (1976) 193–212 and Ford (1992) 35–9. Whether the name Ὀμηρος itself means something like 'fitting together' (as though ὁ μ- + a form of δρᾶρεῖν; see, e.g., Nagy (1979) 296–300)—an etymology that is by no means certain—is of no concern in this context since, unlike Hesiod, Homer never names himself.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Schmitt (1967) 296–301 on poetic building and weaving metaphors, as well as Durante (1960) 234–44.

⁵⁵ See Lesky (1961) on 'dual motivation' in Homer (30–1 specifically on poetry), as well as Murray (1981) 96–7.

on the context and on individual intention. In fact, Archaic authors mostly navigated between the two extremes, stressing both the artistic achievement of poets and their dependence on the goddesses of poetry. They therefore tended not to represent the poet as either an independent 'maker' (the word ποιητής in the sense 'poet' is attested only from the fifth century; see, e.g., Durante (1960) 234–5) or a madman speaking in some kind of trance; a reasonable compromise was his depiction as a professional taught by the Muses. On the whole, Hesiod, too, follows this strategy, summarizing his *Dichterweihe* with the words, αἴ' [sc. Μοῦσαι] νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλήν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδῆν (*Th.* 22);⁵⁶ this does not prevent him, however, from alluding, with the phrase γαστέρες οἶον, to a different way of conceptualizing the interaction of poet and Muses. Note also that v. 26 is spoken by the goddesses of poetry themselves, who are intent on stressing their own powers, and that the address 'mere bellies', which would reduce the role of the poet to that of a passive instrument, is clearly intended as a (teasing) insult.

With our reading of γαστέρες οἶον as having to do with inspiration, we do not intend to discredit the more obvious interpretation that the Muses are attacking the shepherds, and thus Hesiod, for their gluttony and semi-bestial life; after all, this appears to have been the ancient reading as well. What we do suggest is that the phrase has a double meaning and that the less obvious sense we hope to have established reflects an old, cross-cultural notion of the belly as a locus of inspiration or possession. In our opinion, it is even possible that Hesiod gleaned the Muses' insult from the century-old store of poetic formulae from which he was working and employed it in his poem without being fully aware of its original connotations. That poets sometimes use traditional diction that they themselves no longer wholly understand has parallels elsewhere; in Hesiod, note the famous case of 'the boneless one' who 'gnaws his foot' (ἀνόστεος ὄν πόδα τένδει, *Op.* 524), a phrase that all ancient commentators take to refer to an octopus (see West (1978) *ad loc.*) and that the poet may have intended to mean exactly that, without realizing that he was using an Indo-European kenning for the penis.⁵⁷ In the case of γαστέρες οἶον, too, Hesiod might just have been a mere uncomprehending mouthpiece of the poetic tradition.

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⁵⁶ On the way in which Hesiod negotiates between his authority and that of the Muses, see also Calame (1986) 55–67, esp. 64–5.

⁵⁷ The *locus classicus* is Watkins (1978); on what Hesiod himself may or may not have understood, see 232.

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